God. Real. Right.

Previous posts have explained why so many people find it difficult to believe in free will. Other prior posts explain that although it may be difficult, it is important to do so. This post continues that theme.
2.2.2 Real justice requires freedom regarding both behavior and character.
The fact that this moral problem for determinism (that determinism implies moral nihilism) is intrinsic to it is also evident from the nature of moral absolutes. If a person’s choices are determined then it becomes impossible to distinguish what is essential about that person’s identity from what is accidental. Either every accident would be a part of essence, or every presumed essence would actually be nothing more than an accident.
But in a world where every characteristic and behavior is necessary rather than (more…)

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Two previous posts identify the most difficult philosophical obstacle and most obvious practical objection to believing in a radical free will.
This post begins the opposite task: identifying the key theological (or philosophical) problem of rejecting the possibility of radical free will. There will be about six posts working on this part of the task.
Subsequent posts will identify the key moral (or practical) problem of denying the reality of radical free will.
2.1.1 To claim that determinism is rationally necessary impugns God’s sovereignty.
One of the first criticisms of the free will position is that the idea of a truly free will impinges on the sovereignty of God. This criticism is actually just (more…)

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