Free Will: It Is Not Meaningless to Talk about It
Tuesday, November 17th, 2009A long series of posts on this site have explained so far (1) why it is challenging to understand how there could be a free will, and (2) that it is much more theologically, philosophically, and ethically crippling to reject its possibility.
This entry begins to make the case (3) that it is possible that there is a free will, and that commitment to the reality of free will renews access to essentials of a Christian worldview, including teleology. Posts to date are compiled here.
3 It is both possible and advantageous to talk about a real and radical free will.
In contrast to the things described so far—that is, in contrast to the impossibility of freedom being what it was originally cracked up to be—suppose freedom is everything originally understood. What exactly would it be? There are two different ways to answer the question, and both are important here. One answer deals with the significant capability of a will. The other deals with just how and where to pigeonhole the will as a thing.
On the first answer, the will’s ability, the most direct route is simply to observe that an individual with a free will can act in different ways given exactly the same circumstances. On the second answer, the will’s metaphysical status, the thing to do is compare it to other things considered to exist. First things first. That is, the next goal is to establish that freedom can be taken to mean that a person has real choices to make; and within that goal, the first step is to demonstrate that such a conception of the will is meaningful even if not empirically demonstrable.
3.1 Freedom can be taken as the ability of an individual to actualize a variety of potentials.
3.1.1 That this view of freedom is empirically unverifiable does not eliminate its significance.
There is no way to prove empirically whether individuals have such a freedom or not. Since an individual can only actualize one behavior in a given circumstance, and since a given circumstance can only appear once, there is no possible way to verify that she could not have gone a different way, or that she could have. That impossibility—the impossibility of proving either way empirically—could lead some to claim that there is no real difference between the two ways of describing the world. One describes it as free, the other as determined. The contention is that both systems offer internally coherent descriptions of the world. For instance: Megan uses the term blue to describe color x, yellow to describe color y, and green to describe color z. Leah, on the other hand, uses the term red to describe color x, yellow to describe color y, and orange to describe color z. (Forget all the complication for the moment. For instance, the only thing that could be meant by “color x” really has nothing to do with what appears as color, but is instead a reference to a certain range of frequency of light.) If everyone agrees to use (more…)



Here’s the Baptist Press story I mentioned on the air yesterday.
Michael Moore certainly knows how to make a spiel entertaining. But no amount of entertainment, and for that matter, rhetoric, can make a claim true. Michael Moore does more than make a claim. Instead, he makes an argument—a series of statements intended to establish another statement, as Monty Python so eloquently stated decades ago. Arguments come in many forms. But regardless of form, some are sound and some are not. Unsound arguments are fallacious by definition. But fallacies also come in many forms. For instance, some are formal (committing at least one error in how the argument is structured, regardless of content) while others are material (making factual claims which are false). Fortunately, Mr. Moore’s fallacies are of both kinds.
Richard Land heads the Southern Baptist’s Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission (ERLC). 

