God. Real. Right.

2.1.2.1.3 The significance of contingency and revelation are directly proportional.
This post does not argue that revelation would have to be unimportant if determinism were true, but rather that the more likely indeterminacy and contingency are, the more fundamentally important special revelation is. It is a point which emerges from the freedom of God and leads then inevitably to the responsibility of people to respond to submit to the revelation.
The fact that the universe could be otherwise, its contingency, is what makes revelation so essential. There are a couple of different means by which humanity can discern truth: reason and revelation. By reason (which is really just an aspect of general revelation) people discern what is necessarily true. (At the conclusion of this post it is implicit that “necessarily” only means something is necessary subsequent to God’s choice to make it so.) But truth which cannot be known by reason alone—what is not necessarily so, but only contingently so—people can know only by revelation. (Experience can provide “knowledge” of sorts, but not of truth, as the series of posts on science contends. But repeating that argument here is not called for.)
Now, considering the choice to be made between the priority of either reason or revelation, the proposed contradiction between God’s omnipotence and His supposed impotence to give up that power in any way has something to say. Open theists even use that dilemma (that God does not have power to give up power) to claim (errantly) that every theist limits God. Normally, though, the limitation sounds something more like “God can only do what can be done.” The point is that in the dispute between limiting God based on reason or limiting reason based on God, it should be obvious that every theist ought to limit reason based on God.
Granted: To say that the universe is contingent (and that God has power to do anything or everything, even make a four sided triangle) does create a contradiction; it violates reason. But to say God cannot do everything violates more than reason—it violates the nature and claims of God. It is better to violate reason than the revelation of God, as this post argues. That being the case, it makes sense to think of Christian truths first in terms of revelation, then in terms of reason.
Holding revelation superior to reason allows believers to defend some biblical doctrines which reason cannot and indeed should not either fully or uniquely justify. In terms of theology or ethics, for instance, contingency (the fact that the universe is so only because God has freely chosen to make it that way) means that theologians and philosophers cannot begin with reason to justify what ought to be or what is. Instead, they must discover and describe what is and ought to be based first on specific revelation. Pacifism might be rationally justifiable, but it is not what the scriptures teach. Women might be essentially identical or even superior to men in every way significant to leadership, but revelation specifies (and contingency allows for) gendered roles. Why? Quite possibly for no reason beyond God’s choice. And how can any such perspective be known as truth? Through revelation, with only potential support or verification coming from another tool contingent on God’s will, reason.