What’s Wrong with Pacifism: It Confuses Contingency with Utility
The objection to force and violence, whether entirely or only for Christians, is misguided. The nature of God, the role of believers, and the universal nature of ethics all attest to the same thing regarding violence. The argument of this post is one small step among many intended to make clear why pacifism is wrong.
There are some things people do solely for the benefit it brings. A man buys gasoline not because gasoline is good, but because getting where he wants to go really fast and without sweat is good. Gasoline is good only insofar as it is useful for accomplishing another good. That usefulness is called utility. The fact that gasoline is only valuable because of its utility is what makes transitioning to different sources of energy possible–what makes the prospect of non-gasoline-consuming cars which could run just as well as gasoline cars but without petroleum’s side-effects so appealing.
Also, there are some things which are what they are only because other things are what they are. If it is hot outside then a woman might want the air conditioner on. If it is cold outside then she may prefer the heater. Whether she wants the air conditioner or heater is contingent on whether it is hot or cold outside. But her nature is the same either way–she just wants it to be a comfortable temperature inside. Her thermostat-desire is contingent on the temperature. But her natural desire for comfort is not.
Obviously, utility and contingency are related. For instance, the value of gasoline is contingent on its utility for transportation. The value of air-conditioning is contingent on its utility for effecting comfort. But they are not the same thing, and the difference between them makes a huge difference when it comes to moral issues.
Utilitarianism is the doctrine that something is not just good because of its utility, but that something is right because of its utility. The use of gasoline is neither moral nor immoral. But it is as good or valuable as it is more advantageous to use it than not. So the value of gasoline is about utility, but not about utilitarianism. Truth, unlike gasoline, has an intrinsic moral value. That is, truth-telling is right in and of itself, not just because of what it brings about. In addition, truth-telling has some utility to it. The more a person tells the truth, the more trust they earn from others, and for instance, the more profitable contracts people will entrust to them. But it is not the utility which makes truth-telling right, as any parent confronting a caught-red-handed child has argued. It is utilitarianism that justifies lying when circumstances merit it. But utilitarianism itself is wrong just for that reason, because it falsely assumes moral values are contingent on utility and not real in themselves.
When people confuse contingency with utility they can confuse what is intrinsically morally right though contingently expressed with what is only contingently valuable. What difference does that confusion make? Grace makes a good example. Grace is not just a useful attribute of God’s personality; it is instead a moral virtue. (In fact, it summarizes several moral virtues He wants portrayed in believers: mercy, kindness, brotherly love, and so on.) But the expression of grace is contingent on circumstances. So in Romans 5:20, “where sin abounded, grace did much more abound.” That it is contingently expressed is the point of adding in verse 21, “with the intended result that as sin reigned unto death so grace might reign unto eternal life.” It is the fact that sin is ruling that affects (or, in this case, even effects) the expression of grace. So grace, like truth-telling, is intrinsically virtuous. But unlike truth-telling, grace’s expression is contingent on need. (Actually, the case can be made that every virtue’s expression is contingent on circumstance. For instance, truth-telling is always right, but silence is sometimes better than speaking—one point of Proverbs 26:4-5.) Grace is always in God’s nature, but it is expressed contingently. However, when people assume that such a contingency means grace is only valuable in its expression, they are making the mistake Paul corrects in Romans 6:1-2 (two verses after Romans 5:20, which is mentioned above). “What shall we say then? Shall we continue in sin that grace may abound? May it never be so.” Grace is expressed when there is sin, but its utility in response to sin is not its only value, nor, by the way, its only occasion for expression.
Similarly, people confuse the contingency of violence with utilitarianism. In the case of war, for instance, people mistakenly hold that war’s utility is its only value. But they are mistaken. First, violence as an expression of punishment, for instance, is in the nature of God. It is expressed only when it is needed, but it is always present. God does not become of a different nature when He expresses judgment. He simply expresses His character with one morally virtuous characteristic instead of another. It is inevitable, then, that students of character must admit that the use of force or violence is not simply a means to an end, but rather a right act whose expression is contingent on the circumstance, but whose moral value is not. Violence is something which brings about other desirable goods. So it has utility. And it is something which is expressed contingently. But it is not something whose value can only be had with a utilitarian justification. Such a confusion leads to all kinds of positions which sound good and right, but are in fact bad because they are irresponsible and wrong because they prevent the expression of virtue. Punishing evil is helpful, but it is also right, and having the character to do so is virtuous. Using force is sometimes helpful, but to defend the interests of victims is also right, and having the character to do so is virtuous.
More another day!
