What’s Wrong with Pacifism: It Confuses Contingency with Utility
The objection to force and violence, whether entirely or only for Christians, is misguided. The nature of God, the role of believers, and the universal nature of ethics all attest to the same thing regarding violence. The argument of this post is one small step among many intended to make clear why pacifism is wrong.
There are some things people do solely for the benefit it brings. A man buys gasoline not because gasoline is good, but because getting where he wants to go really fast and without sweat is good. Gasoline is good only insofar as it is useful for accomplishing another good. That usefulness is called utility. The fact that gasoline is only valuable because of its utility is what makes transitioning to different sources of energy possible–what makes the prospect of non-gasoline-consuming cars which could run just as well as gasoline cars but without petroleum’s side-effects so appealing.
Also, there are some things which are what they are only because other things are what they are. If it is hot outside then a woman might want the air conditioner on. If it is cold outside then she may prefer the heater. Whether she wants the air conditioner or heater is contingent on whether it is hot or cold outside. But her nature is the same either way–she just wants it to be a comfortable temperature inside. Her thermostat-desire is contingent on the temperature. But her natural desire for comfort is not.
Obviously, utility and contingency are related. For instance, the value of gasoline is contingent on its utility for transportation. The value of air-conditioning is contingent on its utility for effecting comfort. But they are not the same thing, and the difference between them makes a huge difference when it comes to moral issues.
Utilitarianism is the doctrine that something is not just good because of its utility, but that something is right because of its utility. The use of gasoline is neither moral nor immoral. But it is as good or valuable as it is more advantageous to use it than not. So the value of gasoline is about utility, but not about utilitarianism. Truth, unlike gasoline, has an intrinsic moral value. That is, truth-telling is right in and of itself, not just because of what it brings about. In addition, truth-telling has some utility to it. The more a person tells the truth, the more trust they earn from others, and for instance, the more profitable contracts people will entrust to them. But it is not the utility which makes truth-telling right, as any parent confronting a caught-red-handed child has argued. It is utilitarianism that justifies lying when circumstances merit it. But utilitarianism itself is wrong just for that reason, because it falsely assumes moral values are contingent on utility and not real in themselves.
When people confuse contingency with utility they can confuse what is intrinsically morally right though contingently expressed with what is only contingently valuable. What difference does that confusion make? Grace makes a good example. Grace is not just a useful attribute of God’s personality; it is instead a moral virtue. (In fact, it summarizes several moral virtues He wants portrayed in believers: mercy, kindness, brotherly love, and so on.) But the expression of grace is contingent on circumstances. So in Romans 5:20, “where sin abounded, grace did much more abound.” That it is contingently expressed is the point of adding in verse 21, “with the intended result that as sin reigned unto death so grace might reign unto eternal life.” It is the fact that sin is ruling that affects (or, in this case, even effects) the expression of grace. So grace, like truth-telling, is intrinsically virtuous. But unlike truth-telling, grace’s expression is contingent on need. (Actually, the case can be made that every virtue’s expression is contingent on circumstance. For instance, truth-telling is always right, but silence is sometimes better than speaking—one point of Proverbs 26:4-5.) Grace is always in God’s nature, but it is expressed contingently. However, when people assume that such a contingency means grace is only valuable in its expression, they are making the mistake Paul corrects in Romans 6:1-2 (two verses after Romans 5:20, which is mentioned above). “What shall we say then? Shall we continue in sin that grace may abound? May it never be so.” Grace is expressed when there is sin, but its utility in response to sin is not its only value, nor, by the way, its only occasion for expression.
Similarly, people confuse the contingency of violence with utilitarianism. In the case of war, for instance, people mistakenly hold that war’s utility is its only value. But they are mistaken. First, violence as an expression of punishment, for instance, is in the nature of God. It is expressed only when it is needed, but it is always present. God does not become of a different nature when He expresses judgment. He simply expresses His character with one morally virtuous characteristic instead of another. It is inevitable, then, that students of character must admit that the use of force or violence is not simply a means to an end, but rather a right act whose expression is contingent on the circumstance, but whose moral value is not. Violence is something which brings about other desirable goods. So it has utility. And it is something which is expressed contingently. But it is not something whose value can only be had with a utilitarian justification. Such a confusion leads to all kinds of positions which sound good and right, but are in fact bad because they are irresponsible and wrong because they prevent the expression of virtue. Punishing evil is helpful, but it is also right, and having the character to do so is virtuous. Using force is sometimes helpful, but to defend the interests of victims is also right, and having the character to do so is virtuous.
More another day!
Tags: Just War, Pacifism, Utilitarianism, Violence
I understand that most arguments against a just-war position degenerate into inconsistent or illogical reasoning… but what of the just-in-war issue? It is clear that violence cannot be catagorically rejected as evil. However, it is equally clear that few wars have been fought with just motives or means.
What constitutes justification for a Christian to go to war? Deposing an evil dictator? Political or economic self-interest?
The post-liberal “constantinian” critique must be answered. Has the Church conflated its own interests with those of the state beyond what is appropriate as a heavenly institution? Have we adopted a view of earthly citizenship that goes beyond submission… to actual identification with unjust interests of secular regimes?
At what point do we decide that the self-interested militarism of the state would take us beyond our responsibility to submit to government in its administration of justice?
I apologize for not presenting an argument… I am uncomfortable in this debate for fear of overlooking something.
You shouldn’t be uncomfortable. You ask great questions and raise real issues.
Other posts will address most of what you’ve mentioned here. But for the sake of timeliness and brevity here are a couple of things.
Both justice-in-war and justice-after-war are significant contemporary issues. On justice-in-war, I suspect (I haven’t fully articulated it yet) there will be two guiding standards: recuperation and retribution. Both are OT standards for enforcement as well. For instance, a thief had to pay back what he stole, doubled. Recuperation was only half the result of his injustice. Punishment was the other half.
On the other question, it is unfortunate that there is a confusion of Christianity and patriotism. But it is equally unfortunate that for many Christians there is no practical application of Christianity to their national citizenship. The Christian’s engagement in war, especially in a democracy, is not as an arms-bearing messenger from God. But as government-serving messenger from God. Not all governments do what is right. And no government does only what is right. But government is right. And Christian participation in government is not only as tolerable as Christian participation in engineering, but as necessary as Christian participation in feeding the hungry.
As in everything where perfection is yet unrealized, where government does wrong, Christians should work to transform that government. (The means of that transformation are worms for another can!) But when a husband is ungodly, the wife does not have the prerogative to ignore or abandon him.
By the way, I do not hold self-interested nationalism as a justification for war. That’s a morally nihilistic approach at the end of the day. War is just when it is in the interest of others (as in a genocide intervention), in the interest of citizens’ security, or in the interest of retributive justice.
There’s much more to say, but some will have to be in other posts. You’re welcome to reply though. I’ll respond as well.
Hey Dr Creamer,
I was wondering I may ask some questions. Do circumstances Like “Racial genocide” dictate a nation is obligated to go to war on behalf of the victims? Secondly should odds of wining the war go into a nation’s decision for declaring war or not declaring war?
God Bless,
Bryan Young
(hopefully without to many grammar errors )
Dr. Creamer:
Thank for the article. I look forward to the ‘others’ and then I may have further questions.
Josh
Bryan, glad you inquire! “Dictate… obligated” is a bit ambiguous for this reason. “Does the knowledge that genocide is happening somewhere impose an obligation on a nation to intervene and stop the genocide?” Unequivocally YES. Proverbs 24:11-12 is a good example of why. (11 If from delivering those taken to death, and those slipping to the slaughter–you keep back; 12 When you say, `Look, we did not know this.’ Is not the Ponderer of hearts the One who understands? And the Keeper of your soul the One who knows? And He has rendered to man according to his work.)
But, “does the knowledge of genocide dictate going to war?” Sometimes. There are prima facie obligations (those which are due at face value in every circumstance) and there are actual obligations (the things we must actually fulfill in order to be just in a particular circumstance). If we had a one-man army, we would not have to send that one man to oppose the Rwandan genocide. We might feel better, and he would die nobly, but we could choose a better, more imposing, route for “delivering those delivered unto death.” On the other hand, suppose we know some of our people will die if we stop that genocide, even a greater number than would die in the genocide, but we do have the ability to stop it, then our moral obligation would still be to stop the genocide.
It’s like asking if I should step between a man and the wife he is beating–even if I know the man is going to kill me and then go back to beating his wife. I must still intervene. But if I have a way to do it which will more likely actualize the justice of punishment on him and deliverance of the wife, then I choose that route. The fact that I must act to the best of my ability regardless of the cost to me is unabated either way, though.
That’s a pretty muddled response due to brevity, so let me know if you’d like clarification or if you’d just like to express your disagreement.
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